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“Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases:  
If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it.”   
        – Ronald Reagan5 
 
Abstract 
We discuss Russia’s underlying motives for issuing its government-
backed cryptocurrency, CryptoRuble, and the implications thereof and 
of other likely-soon-forthcoming government-issued cryptocurrencies to 
some stakeholders (populace, governments, economy, finance, etc.), 
existing decentralized cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum), 
as well as the future of the world monetary system (the role of the U.S. 
therein and a necessity for the U.S. to issue CryptoDollar), including a 
future algorithmic universal world currency that may also emerge. We 
further provide a comprehensive list of references on cryptocurrencies.  
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“A cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses cryptography for security. A 
cryptocurrency is difficult to counterfeit because of this security feature. A defining feature of a 
cryptocurrency, and arguably its most endearing allure, is its organic nature; it is not issued by 
any central authority, rendering it theoretically immune to government interference or 
manipulation.” [Investopedia, 2017] A plethora of decentralized cryptocurrencies has emerged 
since the inception of Bitcoin (BTC) in 2009 following a seminal white paper by Nakamoto 
[2008],6 with the total market capitalization now exceeding $170B [CoinMarketCap, 2017].7 
 Decentralization and anonymity of transactions make cryptocurrencies appealing to a 
range of users,8 but, unsurprisingly, not to central banks or sovereign governments. However, 
decentralization and blockchain technology [Nakamoto, 2008] are not synonymous. Blockchain 
is a ledger for keeping a record of all transactions. Fiat money, albeit imperfectly, can be viewed 
as an attempt to approximate such recordkeeping9 [Kocherlakota, 1998].10 However, there are 
impeding factors such as fragmented recordkeeping prone to errors and fraud.11 Even with 
electronic transactions,12 notwithstanding the existence of central banking systems, 
recordkeeping is still local by nature. Blockchain provides a robust (albeit not infallible)13 
technological solution to this problem.14  
Government-issued cryptocurrencies? 
Recent reports suggest that Russia will soon issue its government-backed cryptocurrency, 
CryptoRuble (see, e.g., [Coldewey, 2017]). Unlike decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin 
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and Ethereum, with CryptoRuble (and other expected government-issued cryptocurrencies) 
there is no mining, all transactions are recorded via blockchain and verified by a centralized 
government authority. Blockchain (cf. traditional bank ledgers) can help prevent/reduce fraud, 
errors, etc.  
 However, the aforesaid benefit of using blockchain is only the tip of the iceberg. With 
decentralized cryptocurrencies, one of the key concerns of central banks and sovereign 
governments is ceding control. With government-issued cryptocurrencies, central banks and 
sovereign governments will gain even more control, not less, than with the current banking 
system. Blockchain maintained by a centralized government authority provides a centralized, 
un-fragmented ledger of all transactions and other information (such as meta-data) associated 
therewith. This is any government’s dream come true! This will make keeping tabs even easier…
 Moreover, as the saying goes, “If you can’t beat them, tax them.”15 This is what Russia in 
part appears to be doing with CryptoRuble. Reportedly (see, e.g., [Coldewey, 2017]),16 
“undocumented” CryptoRubles (those without proof of origin) will be subject to a 13% tax. This 
is akin to a government-mandated money laundering machine and with such a low overhead 
should be extremely attractive to all sorts of shady players. Russia will attract not only Russian 
but also foreign money (including dirty money, but not only). CryptoRuble will likely act as a tax 
shelter for U.S. and other subjects. One imbedded bonus for the Russian government is that it 
will own the information encoded in blockchain, including potentially shady transactions, and it 
can use this information in the future as Kompromat17 against such (unsuspecting) transactors.   
 However, Russia’s (or another at-odds-with-the-West state’s) primary goal in issuing a 
government cryptocurrency is to free their monetary system from the controls exerted by the 
Federal Reserve (Fed), European Central Bank (ECB) and their allied central banks. CryptoRuble 
creates a buffer layer (see Figure 1) that only the Russian government has control over with 
pertinent information inaccessible to the U.S., the E.U., etc. Russian elite/oligarchs can launder 
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their money using CryptoRuble, become impervious to (or less affected by) economic sanctions, 
make their assets currently tied up because of the U.S./E.U. controls (more) liquid, and so on. 
 For instance, consider an oligarch targeted by sanctions. With the advent of CryptoRuble 
this oligarch could setup a new shell company (e.g., via a convoluted web of trusts) to continue 
a prior line of business (e.g., exports of Russian oil or some other commodity). Revenues of this 
shell company can be legally converted into CryptoRubles. These CryptoRubles can then be 
converted into funds (or property, good/services, etc.) accessible by the oligarch. Since 
CryptoRuble uses a centralized blockchain as a non-distributed ledger only available to the 
Russian government, the conversion of the CryptoRubles into the funds accessible by the 
oligarch remains hidden from the Fed/ECB/U.S./E.U. The Russian government may tax these 
funds at 13% if the oligarch does not disclose their origin, but this is a small price to pay. Thus, 
CryptoRuble will allow various individuals and companies to skirt sanctions. Reportedly, North 
Korea is already suspected of using Bitcoin for precisely this purpose [Boylan and Taylor 2017]. 
 Undoubtedly, CryptoRuble will disrupt the current world monetary system, the Fed, 
ECB, U.S. and E.U. policies, their law enforcement operations, etc. Drug money will be easier to 
clean. Anti-money laundering (AML) controls and efforts will be adversely affected – with the 
anticipated 13% haircut, this Russian government-sponsored money laundry is simply too 
attractive to those with nefarious intents and will undoubtedly incent shady players.18 Money 
will flow away from the U.S./E.U./U.K. and into Russia. Other countries will likely issue their 
own cryptocurrencies. Other BRICS members (Brazil, China, India and South Africa)19 are natural 
candidates. Reportedly, China is also considering issuing its own cryptocurrency [Yanfei, 2017]. 
Other countries that could jump on the bandwagon might be Switzerland (considering its 
history of banking secrecy largely dismantled by the U.S. efforts), Baltic states (which tend to be 
forward-thinking), Nordic states, Singapore, and perhaps some others. Reportedly, even Spain 
is considering creating a national blockchain-based ledger [Shieber, 2017], although it is unclear 
what impact this might have for the (E.U.) monetary system as Spain is part of the Eurozone.  
                                                          
18
 Multiple government-issued cryptocurrencies (see below) will only exacerbate deterioration of AML controls.  
19
 Reportedly, India is considering introducing government-issued cryptocurrency “Lakshmi” [Bhayani, 2017]. Dubai 
is contemplating government-issued cryptocurrency “emCash” [Dubai DED, 2017]. Estonia [Browne, 2017a] and 
Kazakhstan [Browne, 2017b] are also looking into government-issued cryptocurrencies. Japanese banks are eyeing 
their own digital currency called “J-Coin” (to be pegged with JPY) [Kharpal, 2017]. And the list is ever growing.    
5 
 
 A key difference between government-issued and decentralized cryptocurrencies is that 
the former do not require mining. Mining is a process whereby GPUs/CPUs solve mathematical 
problems by a brute-force method to verify transactions. Miners are rewarded with small 
payments in respective cryptocurrencies. One issue with mining is that it is computationally and 
energy costly and has been argued to be inefficient and possibly even unsustainable (see, e.g., 
[Bariviera, 2017], [Kostakis and Giotitsas, 2014], [Nadarajah and Chu, 2017], [Urquhart, 2016],  
[Vranken, 2017]) as blockchain grows with each verified transaction. Centralized government-
issued cryptocurrencies do not require mining, in some sense are more “efficient”, should be 
cheaper to maintain and more readily usable as legal tender in large economies such as Russia.   
 The new era is being ushered in. The world order as we know it is changing, right before 
our eyes. This disruptive technology – cryptocurrencies – will indeed end up disrupting the 
status quo. However, at least in the mid-term, forward-thinking sovereign states that embrace 
and adapt it to their advantage will end up being the disruptors as opposed to disrupted. The 
U.S. is the sovereign state with most to lose in this process, with a clear policy implication: 
adapt to the changing reality, issue CryptoDollar now, or risk being marginalized.20 
Implications to stakeholders   
What about other stakeholders? In Table 2 we outline some stakeholders with pros and cons 
from government-issued cryptocurrencies. E.g., the populace benefits from lower transaction 
costs, but the price to pay is diminished privacy and a greater control by the government. 
 As another example consider banks and other traditional financial institutions. 
Government-issued cryptocurrencies will diminish some functions of, e.g., banks since the 
traditional local-by-nature bank ledgers will become obsolete. So will paper money with the 
implications to ATMs and bank fees associated with them. Generally, transaction costs will be 
reduced, a bad news for banks. However, this does not make banks obsolete as they have a 
number of other functions, e.g., provision of credit (credit cards, mortgages, car loans, etc.). 
 CryptoRuble will have implications for existing decentralized cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin and Ethereum, etc. In the short term, higher volatility for decentralized cryptocurrencies 
can be expected due to two competing perceptions: i) government-issued cryptocurrencies go 
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against the key premise of decentralized cryptocurrencies, to wit, decentralization; and ii) on 
the other hand, they lend increased credibility to blockchain technology. In the beginning there 
likely will be a lot of noise and uncertainty, political jostling, security concerns, fear-mongering 
in press coverage, etc. However, it is feasible that in the longer-term decentralized 
cryptocurrencies will benefit from increased credibility and even more users will jump on the 
bandwagon, both those motivated by a major world power issuing its own cryptocurrency as 
well as those perceiving this as sovereign governments attempting to exert more control. 
Interesting times lie ahead.  
iCurrency?  
It is likely not a stretch to imagine that 100 years from now there will be no cash or paper 
money.21 Just as bronze, silver and gold coins, paper money will soon seem archaic if not 
barbaric. One may argue that currently used electronic transactions already are replacing cash. 
However, the current banking system itself is based on an outdated technology. Will blockchain 
replace it? It is conceivable that other technologies will replace blockchain. Only time will tell. 
 Introduction of government-issued cryptocurrencies is a pivotal moment for humankind. 
While such cryptocurrencies do not meet the four criteria we set forth in [Kakushadze and Liew, 
2015a] for iCurrency, a purely algorithmic universal numeraire and possibly a universal world 
currency, in the long-term the rise of government-issued cryptocurrencies may well seed the 
process ultimately leading to iCurrency. Assuming a bright future for humankind devoid of 
wars, with a truly globalized economy and interplanetary travel with colonies on Mars, it is 
difficult to imagine that kind of a world without a universal world currency. iCurrency is defined 
as a universal numeraire subject to the following criteria [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015a]: 
  1. iCurrency is not a currency issued (or backed) by any government; 
 2. it is valued based solely on supply and demand; 
 3. it is easily transferred across regions and globally accepted as a payment   
  method; and 
 4.  it is algorithmic, with no human intervention. 
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It is conceivable that a broad consortium of sovereign governments issues iCurrency, in which 
case Criterion 1 above can still be preserved so long as robust mechanisms are set in place to 
prevent any government or a group of governments from engaging in possible manipulation of  
iCurrency, e.g., via (analogs of) central banks artificially increasing or decreasing interest rates, 
monetary supply manipulation, political influences, and so forth. Criterion 2 above may be most 
challenging in the context of achieving stability and low volatility.22 In this regard, a staged 
rollout of iCurrency may be warranted, whereby its value is determined by a combination of 
supply and demand and regulation by a central authority. E.g., the USD/HKD spread trades 
between 7.75 and 7.85, a band fixed by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. iCurrency too could 
be regulated at first to stay in such a target zone, which could be gradually relaxed and perhaps 
removed entirely at some future time. Or perhaps some wide target zone could remain.23  
 iCurrency would allow to more precisely estimate global inflation, global output, global 
productivity, global labor gains, and other global macroeconomic indicators, as well as GDP 
(gross domestic product) for various countries and regions and globally. (GDP measured using 
iCurrency was termed iGDP in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015a]). With low sovereign government 
intervention and low fees for global transactions, iCurrency should be a boon to our global 
economy. Perhaps somewhat ironically, government-issued cryptocurrencies may be a step 
forward (not backward) in this regard, depending on how the world leaders approach this issue. 
  At first, it may be unexpected that Russia, out of all the countries, has emerged as a 
“leader” in this process. However, shortly after we published our paper [Kakushadze and Liew, 
2015a], it became evident to us that Russia was in a unique position to lead this process 
[Kakushadze and Liew, 2015b].24 And the reason is not technological but geopolitical. Russia has 
been subject to sanctions and global pressure due to its various policies w.r.t. its immediate 
neighbors and elsewhere in the world. Dependence on the existing world monetary order is a 
major stumbling block for Russia. Its desire to gain a greater degree of independence from the 
Fed/ECB is by no means a surprise. Cryptocurrencies arguably provide a simple solution for 
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Russia. One could imagine that, if pushed into a corner, Russia could even adopt Bitcoin as a 
legal tender [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015b]. However, that would mean ceding too much 
control over information. Somewhat less dramatically, the next natural move for Russia is to 
issue its own government-backed cryptocurrency, CryptoRuble. If anything, it is surprising it 
took them so long. 
 It appears that government-issued cryptocurrencies are a foregone conclusion. Large 
sovereign states have the technological know-how and means to do this. What about small 
and/or developing countries? If they are forced to outsource issuance of their government-
backed cryptocurrencies to larger states, geopolitical and economic implications are evident: 
less sovereignty and ceding control over crucial information to more powerful countries.25 
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Rank Name Symbol Market Cap, $B Price, $ Volume (24h), $M 
1 Bitcoin BTC 94.165 5662.60 1,817 
2 Ethereum ETH 30.484 320.36 459 
3 Ripple XRP 9.374 0.243270 518 
4 Bitcoin Cash BCH 6.045 361.91 854 
5 Litecoin LTC 3.223 60.34 199 
Table 1. Top 5 cryptocurrencies by market capitalization. The data (market capitalization and 
volume are rounded) is taken from [CoinMarketCap, 2017] as of approximately 1:00 PM EDT on 
October 17, 2017. 
 
 
Stakeholder Pros Cons 
Populace Low  transaction costs Security and privacy concerns, 
government control 
Issuing governments Control over transactions, 
information 
Cannibalization of the existing 
monetary system 
Other governments Loss of control (for some) Lower regulatory burdens   
Banks Low error and fraud rates Lower fees        
Small Businesses (including 
FinTech, but not only) 
Higher growth, increased 
opportunities for new 
technological developments 
Reputational risks (money 
laundering, fraud, etc.) 
Finance Higher growth, new asset 
classes 
Destabilization of the current 
business models  
Economy Higher growth, facilitated 
internet commerce 
Learning curve, reputational 
risks 
Non-government 
organizations (NGOs) 
Injecting technology into 
developing countries 
Learning curve 
Heads of states Forward-looking/progressive 
thought leadership, control 
over information and 
monetary transactions 
Resistance from opposition 
(to authoritarian tendencies, 
etc.) 
Marketplace participants Simpler/more transparent 
monetary transactions 
Increased government control 
and potential interference  
Decentralized 
cryptocurrencies (BTC, ETH, 
etc.) 
Creating perception of 
legitimacy (longer-term) 
Even higher volatility then 
currently (short-term) 
Table 2. Potential pros and cons to some stakeholders from government-issued 
cryptocurrencies. 
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Figure 1. A schematic depiction of the money flow into and from CryptoRuble. CryptoRuble 
creates a buffer layer that only the Russian government has control over with pertinent 
information inaccessible to the Fed/ECB (or their allied central banks), the U.S., the E.U., etc. 
